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Damages for breach of a Keep-Open Clause: 
Douglas Shelf Seven Ltd v Co-operative 
Wholesale Society Ltd
In recent years the courts have been more used to considering the question of “keep-
open” clauses in leases from the perspective of whether or not such clauses may 
be enforced by order of specifi c implement.1 As it is less common to fi nd detailed 
judicial consideration of the quantum of damages which may be claimed for breach 
of keep-open clauses, the decision of the Outer House in Douglas Shelf Seven Ltd 
v Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd and another2 is worthy of note. In a detailed 
judgment running to over six hundred paragraphs, Lord Reed makes some impor-
tant observations on the assessment of damages in such cases, as well as on whether 
consent to a sub-lease constitutes delegation of the tenant’s duty to keep the premises 
open. 
A. BACKGROUND
The facts of the case, briefl y stated, were that the pursuers were the landlords of a 
shopping centre in Dundee, the defenders tenants of supermarket premises within 
the shopping centre under a sub-lease. The lease between the parties contained a 
typical keep-open clause.3 The defenders themselves had further sub-let the premises 
in 1993 to the third party in the action, originally Shoprite, subsequently Kwik Save. 
Kwik Save traded from the premises until 1995 when they threw up the lease, since 
which date the premises had lain vacant. The pursuers subsequently raised proceed-
ings for damages for breach of contract against the defenders.4 
The supermarket premises were typical anchor premises, in that they were intended 
by the pursuers to draw shoppers in to the shopping centre. As in previous keep-open 
litigation, the closure of the anchor premises was argued by the pursuers to have led 
to a loss of trade at other units in the centre, thereby reducing the letting value of 
such other units and making them more diffi cult to re-let when unit leases came up 
for renewal. All of this was argued to have led to a diminution in the capital value of 
the shopping centre, as well as a loss of rental income from the leases of the other 
units. In response, the defenders argued that the keep-open clause did not impose 
an obligation on them to keep the premises open, since the pursuers’ predecessors as 
1 See Retail Parks Investments Ltd v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (No 2) 1996 SC 227. See, for English 
law, Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1998] AC 1.
2 [2007] CSOH 53, 2007 GWD 9-167. 
3 The defenders were obliged to “keep the premises open for retail trade during the usual hours of busi-
ness in the locality … the shop display windows being kept dressed in a suitable manner and in keeping 
with a good class shopping centre”. The sub-under-lease imposed the same obligation upon the third 
party.
4 The action was raised in 1999, then sisted from 2000 until 2004 until a complex proof before answer was 
held over 63 days from March 2005 to March 2006.
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landlords had consented to the granting of the sub-lease to the third party, and that, 
in any event, the pursuers’ losses had not been caused by any breach of the keep-open 
clause but by other factors, and also that any losses of the pursuers were much less 
than the amount claimed.
The primary interest of the case lies in what it says about the assessment of damages 
in cases where there is a long period of continuous breach by a contracting party, 
specifi cally a tenant. In undertaking this assessment, Lord Reed had to deal with diffi -
culties of causation and remoteness as well as arguments relating to the point at which 
damages should be quantifi ed. The causal and remoteness issues broke down into two 
questions. First, were the losses of the pursuers to be attributed, at least to some extent, 
to the defenders’ breach of contract, or were they to be attributed wholly to extra-
neous factors? This question might in theory be considered either under the heading 
of causation or remoteness of damage. Second, given that there were a number of 
reasonable ways in which the defenders might have discharged their duty to keep the 
premises open for retail trade, which of these ways was the court to presuppose for the 
purposes of assessing the losses caused by the breach of contract? 
B. CAUSATION AND REMOTENESS OF DAMAGE
In relation to the fi rst question (of causation and remoteness of damage), the defenders 
argued that factors beyond their control had been the cause of the pursuers’ losses, 
namely changes in the local area (such as the opening of competitor retail premises), 
design defects of the shopping centre, the poor location of the premises in relation 
to road networks, and general social and economic change. They also argued that 
improvements made to the centre by the pursuers in 1998 had been unreasonable and 
unforeseeable and had thus acted as a novus actus interveniens, breaking the chain 
of causation between any breach of contract and the losses suffered. Although this 
latter argument was held procedurally inadmissible,5 Lord Reed considered the other 
arguments relating to possible alternative reasons for the losses. He noted that there 
might be different ways of characterising such arguments:6
Counsel for the pursuers addressed these matters under the rubric of remoteness; and I 
am content to do the same. There are often different possible ways of rationalising restric-
tions on liability: lines can be drawn in terms of the scope of the obligation, or causation, or 
remoteness. The central problem is usually deciding where to draw the lines, rather than 
which conceptual route to follow.
It is quite true that there are a variety of approaches by which seemingly similar 
causal questions have been treated by courts. On the facts of Douglas Shelf Seven, 
there had been an initial event (the closure of the supermarket) to which causal 
questions could in theory have been addressed, but it was diffi cult to relate causally 
any specifi c capital or rental value losses either to that initial or to any later specifi c 
event. This made the usual judicial analysis of initial loss (judged according to causa-
5 Although Lord Reed does remark, obiter (para 597), of the defenders’ arguments that “[i]n any event, 
however, the contention is not in my opinion established by the evidence”.
6 Para 599. 
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tion proper) and further consequent or secondary loss (judged according to the rules 
on remoteness of damage) hard to apply. Given this diffi culty, the decision by Lord 
Reed to subsume all broadly causal issues under the single heading of remoteness of 
damage does not seem unreasonable. 
Applying recent authorities on remoteness in breach of contract such as Jackson v 
Royal Bank of Scotland,7 as well as the classic Hadley v Baxendale8 test, Lord Reed 
concluded that major social and economic changes which might, given the length of 
the lease, have had a substantial effect on the capital and income generating value of 
the premises would have been within the contemplation of the parties when the lease 
was made and were therefore factors of a type which were not too remote from the 
breach of contract to be relevant in assessing damages.9 They were thus properly to 
be treated as factors impacting on the losses suffered, although not to the exclusion 
of the factor for which the defenders were responsible, their breach of contract. Lord 
Reed’s conclusion, weighing up all of the factors judged to have had an effect on the 
value of the centre at the date of the action, was that, as determination of the contri-
bution made by the defenders’ breach of contract to the overall losses suffered was a 
diffi cult exercise, it was appropriate “to assess damages on a broad basis”.10 Given the 
complexity and uncertainty surrounding how the multiple causal factors had affected 
the pursuers’ losses, Lord Reed’s broad approach seems the best that any judge is 
likely to be able to do in such a case. No doubt this approach is frustrating for pursuers 
who, as in this case, seek to lead multiple expert witnesses over several weeks of oral 
pleading, but this merely serves to underline the dangers inherent in relying upon 
a damages claim for losses which fl ow from multiple causes, rather than in seeking 
specifi c implement. 
In relation to the second causal issue raised by the case, Lord Reed had to imagine 
how the defenders might have behaved had they not broken the keep-open provision. 
Such a counterfactual enquiry is acutely prone to causal uncertainty, because the past 
hypothetical behaviour of parties is often unpredictable and, in theory, may have to be 
treated by courts as indeterminate.11 This is especially likely to be so in cases where 
what is at issue is the past hypothetical behaviour of a defender faced with more than 
one alternative course of action each of which will discharge properly its contractual 
duties. Excusing defenders on account of such indeterminacy would lead to injus-
tice, however, so it is not surprising that courts have considered themselves able to 
formulate rules to deal with such uncertainties. In this respect, Lord Reed referred 
to the English case of Paula Lee Ltd v Robert Zeehil & Co Ltd,12 where just such a 
rule was formulated to deal with the uncertainty caused by a defendant who might 
have behaved in one of several reasonable ways in fulfi lling its contractual duties. In 
7 [2005] UKHL 3, (2005) 1 WLR 377.
8 (1854) 9 Exch 341.
9 Paras 600-601. 
10 Para 607. On that basis, Lord Reed assessed the diminution in capital value at £450,000, and accrued 
revenue losses at £149,698.
11 See further on this point M Hogg, “The role of causation in delict” 2005 JR 89, especially at 122 f. 
Although this article concentrates mainly on causation in delict, what it says on past hypotheticals is 
equally applicable to breach of contract cases.
12 [1983] 2 All ER 390.
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that case, Mustill J, discussing the nature of the duty imposed upon such a defendant, 
stated:13
A duty ... may often be construed as an obligation to act reasonably, and the damages will 
be assessed on the basis of what would have been reasonable… But what of the case where 
there is more than one reasonable method…? One possible view is that the court should 
try to forecast how the defendant would have performed but for the repudiation. In my 
opinion this approach is inconsistent with principle, since the defendant may in the event 
have done no more than was necessary to qualify as reasonable, and to assess damages on any 
other basis would be to penalise him for failing to do something which he was not obliged 
to do. The answer must, in my judgment, be that the court is to look at the range of reason-
able methods, and select the one which is least unfavourable to the defendant, bearing in 
mind, of course, that in deciding what methods qualify as reasonable the question must be 
approached with the interests of both parties in mind.
Lord Reed was persuaded that the approach of Scots law to this diffi culty was the 
same. In other words, he adopted a method of selecting, from the range of possible 
reasonable behaviour of the defenders, that behaviour which was least unfavourable 
to the defenders’ position, even if it might not have been the behaviour most likely to 
have occurred absent breach (because, for instance, the defenders might have chosen 
to perform at a standard other than the minimum required). While causal theorists 
might argue about whether this is the causally proper approach, it has at least the merit 
of being an equitable approach to dealing with this type of causal uncertainty. Such 
approach did not, however, greatly assist the defenders, because Lord Reed believed 
that the pursuers had in any event not been arguing that the defenders should have 
traded as if they were “modelled on Harrods’ Food Hall”,14 but only that they were 
obliged to trade in a way appropriate for that part of Dundee in which the shopping 
centre was located. Had they acted in such a way, this would have attracted customers 
to the centre. Lord Reed thus accepted that failure to keep open the premises and 
trade in such a reasonable fashion was a cause (although not the only cause) of the 
losses claimed.
C. THE PROPER TIME FOR ASSESSING DAMAGES
Apart from such causal and remoteness questions, the second important issue which 
the case raises about the assessment of contractual damages is the moment at which 
it is appropriate to assess a pursuer’s loss. The normal rule, in cases where breach of 
contract occurs at a single identifi able point in time, is that damages fall to be assessed 
at that point. This approach is not, however, so evidently appropriate to cases where a 
breach is ongoing. Lord Reed recognised this diffi culty, and dismissed the argument 
that damages in such cases should be assessed at the single point when the breach 
fi rst began as “unpersuasive”.15 Instead the appropriate point of time against which to 
compare the position in which the pursuer might have been, absent the breach, was 
“the most recent date practicable, not… the date when the failure began”.16
13 At 394.
14 Para 592.
15 Para 603.
16 Para 603.
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In support of this view, Lord Reed referred to Transworld Land Co Ltd v J Sains-
bury plc,17 in which the same approach had been adopted by Knox J. It might be 
added that Lord Reed’s approach is consistent with that subsequently taken in the 
recent decision of the House of Lords in Golden Strait Corporation v Nippon Yusen,18 
another case in which events occurring after breach but before the hearing of the case 
were considered properly to affect the assessment of damages.
This approach to the date for assessing damages raises further problems for 
landlords considering whether or not to choose the remedy of damages. If, following 
Lord Reed, damages may fall to be assessed at some point after the tenant’s breach, 
in a landlords’ market it may be best to claim damages immediately following that 
breach, for, if the market is subsequently saturated, a later claim may yield signifi cantly 
less by way of damages. On the other hand, if the market subsequently dries up, a later 
claim may benefi t the landlord. Predicting the future market is an activity fraught with 
diffi culty, a diffi culty which complicates further the landlord’s choice between specifi c 
implement and damages. 
D. SUBCONTRACTING: DELEGATION OF CONTRACTUAL DUTIES?
The fi nal issue of note in the decision, albeit obiter,19 was the question of whether 
the grant of the sub-under-lease to the third party was to be seen as having released 
the defenders from their duty to occupy and keep open the premises. The defenders’ 
argument was essentially that the granting of the sub-under-lease had amounted to a 
delegation (or a novation) of their keep-open duty, thus discharging the defenders from 
that duty. Unsurprisingly, Lord Reed was not sympathetic to this line of argument. In 
his view there was nothing in the facts before him to justify deviating from the normal 
contractual principle that, in sub-contracting, a contracting party is not released from 
the responsibility of performing its own duties. The fact that the pursuers’ predecessors 
as landlords had consented to the sub-lease was of no relevance in this regard.20 Lord 
Reed also cast doubt on comments by Lord Macfadyen in Britel Fund Trustees Ltd v 
Scottish & Southern Energy plc21 on the effect of a subtenancy on the tenant’s duties. 
Lord Macfadyen had expressed the view that, where a subtentant was in occupation 
of premises, this would create an “an implied qualifi cation of the express obligation 
[of the tenant] to occupy”. In Lord Reed’s view, it was preferable to say that, where 
occupation by a subtenant is permitted, that occupation is to be seen as if it were the 
occupation of the tenant: “qui facit per alium facit per se. A tenant’s obligation to enter 
into and retain possession of the subjects does not necessarily (or ordinarily) require 
his personal occupation of them.”22 This is surely the preferable analysis. The idea that 
subcontracting “qualifi es” in some way the duty of the main contractor comes danger-
ously close to equating subcontracting with assignation. 
17 [1990] 2 EGLR 255.
18 [2007] UKHL 12, [2007] 2 WLR 691.
19 Paras 559-576.
20 Paras 577-578.
21 2002 SLT 223.
22 Para 581.
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E. CONCLUSION
Although Douglas Shelf Seven Ltd is only a decision of the Outer House, the 
lengthy consideration by Lord Reed of the issues raised is likely to mark it out as an 
infl uential decision. It serves as a warning, both to landlords and tenants. Landlords 
must undertake a diffi cult task in considering whether specifi c implement or damages 
is the preferable claim; tenants must appreciate that protracted breach on their part 
will not furnish an argument that the effects of such breach will necessarily be super-
seded by other causal factors.
Martin Hogg
University of Edinburgh 
An Unsatisfactory Hire-Purchase
In Lamarra v Capital Bank plc and Shields Automotive Ltd,1 the Inner House of the 
Court of Session, on appeal from the sheriff principal,2 dealt with the issues of “satis-
factory quality” and the remedies relating to it, in relation to a hire-purchase contract 
of a luxury motor vehicle. The relevant statutory provisions were sections 10(2)-10(2B) 
and 12A of the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973, which correspond to 
sections 14(2)-14(2B) and 15B of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Hence, the Lamarra 
case not only speaks to the 1973 Act, but to the 1979 Act as well. 
A. THE FACTS
The case involved a standard hire-purchase arrangement. There was an initial sale, 
by the original owner (Shields), of the goods (“a 4.6 litre Range Rover motor vehicle” 
described as “a new top-of-the-range-automatic model”) to a fi nancier (Capital Bank), 
for £51,550. This was followed by Capital Bank, as the new owner, hiring the goods 
to a hirer (Lamarra), pursuant to a hire-purchase agreement dated 9 March 2001. 
The terms of repayment were that Lamarra was to pay a £6,717.82 deposit, with “36 
monthly instalments”, comprising £1,422.80 per month, except for the fi rst instal-
ment which was £1,517.80. The Bank’s profi t on the transaction was approximately 
£6,500. Although it is not referred to in the case, Lamarra would have had an option 
to purchase. After paying the deposit and the fi rst two instalments, Lamarra ceased to 
make further payments. By letter of 30 March 2001, there was a purported rejection, 
owing to defects in the Range Rover. The vehicle was subsequently collected a little 
over two months later. At the time of its collection, the Range Rover had been driven 
for approximately 6,000 miles, which included some mileage after rejection, but it was 
held, by the sheriff, that this did not make the rejection invalid.3 This decision was not 
1 [2006] CSIH 49, 2007 SC 95. The court, an Extra Division, comprised Lords Osborne, Phillip and 
Kirkwood. Lord Osborne delivered the court’s opinion.
2 2005 SLT (Sh Ct) 21. The sheriff principal was J C McInnes QC.
3 2007 SC 95 at para 5. 
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